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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND COALITION POLITICS 
SHERYLL D. CASHIN* 
Professor Days began his Childress Lecture by recounting his personal 
experience with Jim Crow segregation.  I too have such a story.  I was born 
and raised in Hunstville, Alabama, a city that is notable, among other things, 
for having desegregated its public accommodations in 1962, two full years 
before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The turning point in the 
non-violent sit-in movement in Hunstville was when a young, African-
American woman was arrested with a four-month-old baby in her arms, along 
with a friend who was eight months pregnant.  This caused some outrage and 
widespread press coverage.  The mother was Joan Carpenter Cashin and the 
baby was me.  I am proud to have played a role, however small, in the most 
important social movement of the twentieth century in the United States. 
In the past year we have celebrated a number of civil rights milestones.  
The fiftieth anniversary of  Brown v. Board of Education.1  The fortieth 
anniversaries of the March on Washington and of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.2  Collectively our nation now venerates our most progressive, socially 
transforming legal edicts, even as we accept, or ignore, persistent racial 
inequality.  Much has been written about the limits and modern meaning of 
Brown.3  Elsewhere I have argued that we have failed to live up to the 
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I would like to thank my Research 
Assistant Zhubin Parang for his invaluable assistance. 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 3. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 6–7 (2004) (discussing Professor Seidman’s 
claim that the Supreme Court’s declaration that separate facilities were inherently unequal 
legitimated current unequal arrangements by suggesting that those who remain poor and 
disempowered had simply failed to take advantage of their definitially equal status); MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
RACIAL EQUALITY 344–442 (2004); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION xv (2004) 
(arguing that the unfulfilled legacy of Brown reflects our nation’s limited commitment to racial 
justice); Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare? THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARV. U. 2, 40 (2004) (arguing, inter alia, that school segregation has 
been increasing since the 1990s and that a renewed commitment to integration is needed, which 
would involve appointing Brown-friendly judges and civil rights enforcement officials, reviving 
federal aid programs that confront race relations issues, and providing financial incentives to 
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integrationist vision animating Brown and the civil rights movement primarily 
because our neighborhoods remain largely segregated by race and class.4  In 
this commentary, I celebrate the coalition politics that made the civil rights 
revolution possible with a view toward understanding how coalition strategies 
might reenergize progressive politics today.  The civil rights movement 
ultimately succeeded because it had moral force, but also because a powerful, 
well-organized grassroots effort altered the previous understanding of a voting 
majority in Congress as to what was in their enlightened self-interest and that 
of the nation.  This is a critical object lesson for progressives of today.  Broad 
coalitions for progressive change are theoretically possible when common 
interests—or a convergence of perceived self-interest—can be established.  
With rising diversity it is increasingly unlikely that a single racial group can 
succeed independently in pursuing a progressive policy agenda.  In racially 
diverse contexts, coalition building is the only route to meaningful political 
power.  Diversity, then, can be a source of power if properly harnessed.  There 
are hopeful current examples of multiracial coalitions that have succeeded in 
transcending potential race and class conflicts and have therefore altered the 
status quo in a policymaking context.  While the path of least resistance is to 
work solely within single issue or single identity constituencies, progressives 
will be increasingly disempowered when they fail to build alliances and 
relationships across boundaries of race and class. 
I.  CELEBRATING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 became law on July 2 of that year, after 57 
days of debate.5 Among the other iconic events of that hot summer were the 
murders of civil rights workers Schwerner, Goodman, and Chaney in 
Mississippi and the Birmingham church bombing that killed four little girls.6  
 
white suburban schools that accept segregated minority students); Lani Guinier, From Racial 
Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence 
Dilemma, 91 J. OF AM. HISTORY 92, 95–96 (2004) (arguing that Brown “redefine[d] equality, not 
as a fair and just distribution of resources, but as the absence of formal, legal barriers that 
separated the races” and “convinced working-class whites that their interests lay in white 
solidarity rather than collective cross-racial mobilization”); Mark Tushnet, Public Law Litigation 
and the Ambiguities of Brown, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 27–28 (1992) (arguing that Brown’s “all 
deliberate speed” standard, authored by Justice Frankfurter in an attempt to limit the expansive 
reach of Brown, ironically greatly expanded the Court’s ability to impact social policy). 
 4. See generally SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND 
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004). 
 5. U.S. Census Bureau, Special Edition, Civil Rights Act of 1964: 40th Anniversary, 
available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_ 
special_editions/001800.html (last updated June 30, 2004) [hereinafter Census Bureau, Special 
Edition]. 
 6. Clarence Page, 40 Years of Opportunities, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 2004, at C9 (citing COLIN 
POWELL, MY AMERICAN JOURNEY (1995)). 
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A young Colin Powell, then an infantry captain undergoing leadership training 
at Fort Benning, Georgia, made it plain to his white colleagues why he was so 
disappointed with Senator Barry Goldwater’s stand against the Act and what 
the new law would mean in Powell’s own life.7  Goldwater was one of only a 
few Republican Senators to vote against the Act, and he made his opposition to 
civil rights the centerpiece of his failed presidential bid against Lyndon 
Johnson in the same year.8  Powell noted that being black meant “you’d better 
have a strong bladder” because in a drive between Washington, D.C. and Fort 
Benning, he and his family were hard pressed to find a decent place to use a 
restroom, to dine, or to spend the night.9  The mantra of property rights 
asserted by his fellow white officers in defense of Goldwater’s position paled, 
he argued, to the indignities being suffered by black folks.10  Powell’s story of 
frustration with interstate travel is a testament to the very different America 
that prevailed under the era of Jim Crow segregation.11 
A. The Act’s Legacy 
In his Childress Lecture, Professor Days provides a comprehensive 
overview of the Act and its civil rights progeny.  I will not attempt to rehearse 
those details here.  Suffice it to say, among its many provisions, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 barred racial discrimination in public accommodations, 
employment, and virtually all federally funded activities, including education, 
and also prohibited discriminatory activities based on other characteristics such 
as gender, religion, and national origin.12  Women’s equality was introduced 
by fiat.  The Act’s ban on “sex” discrimination in employment was actually 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. According to Kenneth Teasdale, Counsel to Majority Leader Mansfield at the time of 
passage of the Act, one of the reasons President Lyndon B. Johnson was sympathetic to the civil 
rights cause was that on his trips from Washington, D.C. and his home in Texas, there was only 
one hotel, located in Atlanta, Georgia, where Johnson and his black driver could both get a room.  
This story was related by Mr. Teasdale as part of a panel discussion in which we both participated 
following the Childress Memorial Lecture, on October 1, 2004. 
 12. Title II of the Act bars discrimination in public accommodations, including hotels and 
restaurants.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000)).  Title VI prohibited recipients of federal funds from 
engaging in discrimination and authorized the federal government to withhold federal funds from 
any program that practiced discrimination.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 
241, 252 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)).  Title VII prohibited 
discrimination in employment by any business employing more than 25 people and established 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to review complaints.  Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-5 (2000)). 
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added by a Southern Democrat in the House in an attempt to derail the bill.13  
As Professor Days articulates so well, since its initial passage, the Act has been 
amended periodically in ways that strengthen its reach and enforcement 
mechanisms, rendering it our Nation’s most comprehensive civil rights 
legislation.  The Act also became the model for other comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
The Act, and its progeny, have had an impact in improving the lives and 
opportunities of many, most notably, African-Americans.  Today, incidents of 
denial of access to public accommodations based upon race or other immutable 
characteristic are rare and typically met with widespread social 
disapprobation.14  According to the Census Bureau, since 1964 the percentage 
of blacks age 25 and older who obtain at least a high school diploma has risen 
from 26 percent to 80 percent.15  The black poverty rate has declined from 
about 42 percent to 24 percent.16  And yet serious gaps of racial inequality 
persist.  For example, in 2002, the black poverty rate was three times higher 
than that of non-Hispanic whites, only 8 percent of whom were poor.17  Black 
median wealth is about 16 percent that of whites, and black median household 
income is about 64 percent that of whites—$29,500 compared to $46,300 for 
whites.18  There are also pronounced differences between blacks and non-
Hispanic whites, inter alia, in employment, educational attainment, and rates 
of imprisonment19—differences that may be tied to stark wealth and class 
 
 13. David B. Filvaroff & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin and Enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 9, 22 (Bernard Grofman ed., 
2000). 
 14. For example, when restaurant chain Denny’s was accused of racial discrimination 
against black customers in many of its restaurants, condemnation was so widespread the chain 
was forced to allow its franchisees to retool menus appealing to minorities, launch an ad 
campaign to repair its public image, and reach an agreement with the NAACP to increase the 
number of blacks in management positions and the number of minority-owned franchises.  Calvin 
Sims, Giving Denny’s a Menu for Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1994, at 43, 45. 
 15. Census Bureau, Special Edition, supra note 5. 
 16. Id. 
 17. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JOSEPH DALAKER, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2002, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-222/.pdf. 
 18. CASHIN, supra note 4, at XII (citing Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. 
Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BULLETIN 89 (January 2003): I, 7–8, and Table 3 (showing black median net worth at 
$19,000 in 2001 compared to $120,990 for whites)). 
 19. Since the 1970s, the black unemployment rate has generally been double that of whites, 
and during economic downturns the unemployment gap increases—that is to say, blacks feel the 
effects of recessions more acutely than whites.  See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 2001 
REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 191 (2001).  Although blacks and whites aged 25–29 
are close to parity in completion of a high school education (in 2000, 87 percent of black men and 
85 percent of black women aged 25–29 completed high school compared with 87 percent of white 
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differences between blacks and whites.20  The persistence of racial inequality 
underscores, in my view, the need to rethink how progressivism can return to 
the center of American politics.  To that end, I turn now to explore how 
coalition politics made enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 possible. 
B. The Act and Coalition Politics 
Passage of the Act was by no means inevitable.  In the near century 
between Reconstruction and the civil rights movement, there were some 
attempts to confer equal rights on black Americans through legislation but, as 
of 1964, none had succeeded in any meaningful way.21  In the ten years 
 
men and 90 percent of white women), blacks aged 25–29 complete college educations at a rate 
much lower than whites (in 2000, 18 percent of black men and 17 percent of black women aged 
25–29 completed a college education, compared with 28 percent of white men and 31 percent of 
white women).  U.S. Census Bureau, Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed 
High School or College, by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex: Selected Years 1940 to 2003, 
available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tabA-2.pdf.  In fact, young 
black males are more likely to end up in the criminal justice system than in institutions of higher 
learning.  CASHIN, supra note 4, at 229.  There are more black men in prison and jails than 
enrolled in colleges and universities, a dramatic and sharp reversal since 1980, when black men 
enrolled in higher education institutions outnumbered black men behind bars by three to one.  Id. 
at 229–30.  The effects of the penal system are harshest in the ghetto, where a majority of black 
men can be under criminal supervision.  Id. at 247. 
 20. Among whites, the raw number of people that populate the lowest economic strata are 
smallest and these numbers grow larger with each rise up the income scale.  With blacks, the 
opposite is true, with more black people populating the lowest economic strata and the raw 
numbers of blacks declining with each rise up the income scale.  In other words, whites as a 
group are more likely to be middle, and upper-class and blacks as a group are more likely to be 
among the lower economic classes.  Harry T. Edwards, The Journey from Brown v. Board of 
Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944, 
969 n.105 (2004).  Poor blacks, in turn, are much more likely than poor whites to live in hyper-
segregated, high poverty neighborhoods, with their attendant weak schools, violence, and limited 
economic opportunity, while poor whites are more likely to live in middle-class settings that 
afford more opportunity for upward mobility.  CASHIN, supra note 4, at 163–65.  One researcher 
has found that high school graduation and college attendance rates are equal for blacks and whites 
when you control for wealth rather than income.  See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING 
IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 68–79 (1999). 
 21. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the work of radical Republicans of the Reconstruction era, 
passed by one vote over President Andrew Johnson’s veto—the first veto override in American 
history.  U.S. Constitution: Civil Rights Act of 1866, at http://www.usconstitution.com/Civil 
RightsActof1866.pict.htm.  It granted full citizenship to all persons born on American soil, except 
Native Americans who were exempt from taxation, and provided that all such citizens were 
guaranteed the rights to make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence in court, and 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.  The Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).  However, most of these provisions were rendered ineffective either 
by the Ku Klux Klan’s reign of terror or the Supreme Court’s limiting Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power only to eliminating slavery.  See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 
21–23 (1883).  It was not until 1968, after the civil rights revolution, that the Court finally 
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between the Supreme Court’s announcement of the Brown decision—declaring 
“separate but equal” racial segregation to be inconsistent with constitutional 
principle22—and the passage of the Act, virtually no progress was made in 
school desegregation.23  It was only when democratic processes demanded 
social change, resulting in new enforcement provisions in Title VI of the Act 
for school desegregation, that some change was forthcoming.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in 1968 in Green v. County School Board, which finally 
announced that immediate school desegregation was the imperative 
consequence of the Court’s decision in Brown,24 likely reflected this new 
democratic consensus. 
This transformation in majoritarian democratic opinion would not have 
happened through mere reliance on the leadership of political elites.  Prior to 
the civil rights movement, most American presidents had been reluctant to 
advocate civil rights legislation because doing so required them to oppose 
well-organized Southern Democrats whom they needed to advance other 
agenda items.25  Before the 1964 Act, the most notable civil rights advances—
 
deemed it appropriate for Congress to confer these citizenship rights on freed slaves under its 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers, as a means of removing the “badges and incidents 
of slavery.”  See, e.g., Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 
U.S. 88, 105 (1971); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976); Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 192 (1989).  The Civil Rights Act of 1875, a final effort by the radial 
Republicans on behalf of emancipated blacks, prohibited discrimination in hotels and other 
lodgings, public transportation, and places of public accommodation.  Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. at 4–10.  The Supreme Court, in the infamous Civil Right Cases, struck down the Act as 
unconstitutional, stating that Congress had no authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
regulate discrimination by private individuals.  Id. at 24–26.  These cases essentially put to rest 
for three quarters of a century any effort by Congress to address civil rights.  JAMES M. 
MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST LEGACY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NAACP 22–23 
(1975).  In 1957 and in 1960, Congress again attempted civil rights legislation, both times 
resulting in Southern Democrats weakening the bills beyond any effectiveness.  See infra note 25. 
 22. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 23. Cass R. Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?, THE NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 103 (noting 
that 98 percent of black students in the South still attended racially segregated schools as of 
1964).  The Brown II decision of 1955, in which the Supreme Court announced that desegregation 
should occur “with all deliberate speed,” is credited with contributing to this considerable lag in 
progress in school desegregation.  See, e.g., OGLETREE, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 24. 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). 
 25. See, e.g., Robert D. Loevy, The Background and Setting of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL 
SEGREGATION 1 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997).  President Roosevelt acted on civil rights only 
through executive actions that did not require congressional approval, establishing a Civil Rights 
Section in the Justice Department and, under threat of a massive black march on Washington, 
creating a Fair Employment Practices Committee to eliminate discrimination in defense plants.  
Id. at 13–14.  Although the Committee was abolished by Congress five years later, Roosevelt’s 
capitulation taught black leaders that social movement pressure could yield policy gains.  Id. 
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President Roosevelt’s order of fair employment practices in the defense 
industry and President Truman’s order to desegregate the armed services—had 
resulted from executive orders that were issued only after the venerable A. 
 
  Truman continued the precedent of using executive powers rather than legislation to 
advance civil rights when he ordered the integration of the United States Armed Forces.  Id. at 15.  
Before he issued his executive order to integrate the Armed Forces, Truman had tried integration 
through legislation.  Id.  The attempt failed, and Truman’s relationship with the Southern 
Democrats in Congress was ruined forever afterwards.  Id. at 25.  He also appointed a Committee 
of Civil Rights, which published a controversial report detailing the civil rights violations blacks 
faced in the South.  Id. at 15. 
  Eisenhower’s administration was initially more reluctant than either Roosevelt or 
Truman to address civil rights issues through legislation, relying on executive action in his first 
three years in office.  Id. at 25.  He ended segregationist practices in the District of Columbia and 
in the U.S. Government bureaucracy, and gave his attorney general broad leeway in pursuing civil 
rights issues, including allowing him to argue for the abolition of school segregation in Brown v. 
Board of Education.  Id. at 16, 25.  Eisenhower’s contributions to civil rights were motivated 
partly by the emerging civil rights movement.  With the national press coverage of the 
Montgomery bus boycott and the rise of Martin Luther King, Jr., the American public was 
becoming more conscious of the condition of blacks in the South.  Northern politicians who had 
been hoping that civil rights could be dealt with quietly and slowly saw their hopes disappear 
with every news broadcast of white Southerners beating peaceful demonstrators.  Andrew Young, 
Roundtable of Participants in the Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in THIS 
CONSTITUTION: THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 29, 31–32 (Raymond E. Wolfinger 
ed., 1991). 
  The decision in Brown forced Eisenhower to directly confront Southern antipathy toward 
integration.  When states refused to integrate their schools, he reluctantly sent in U.S. Marshals to 
enforce the Supreme Court’s orders.  Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 13, at 10.  This action 
cost Eisenhower a tremendous amount of support in both the South and in Congress.  By the 
beginning of Eisenhower’s second term, civil rights issues could no longer be confined to 
executive action.  Black leaders’ demands that the government take a more active role in ending 
discrimination were beginning to resonate with more and more Americans, especially as the 
national news covered the violent assaults suffered by activists in the South.  JAMES L 
SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON YEARS 222 
(1968).  In 1956, Eisenhower reluctantly allowed Attorney General Brownell to present a civil 
rights bill to Congress.  Id. at 226. Eventually called the Civil Rights Act of 1957, it provided for 
the creation of a Commission on Civil Rights that would study racial discrimination and 
recommend remedies; the expansion of the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department; the 
ability of the attorney general to secure court injunctions in civil rights cases and remove them 
from state courts to federal courts; and an increase in the Justice Department’s power to prosecute 
interferences with the right to vote.  Id. at 223–38. 
  The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was doomed from the start.  Eisenhower did not even 
endorse the entire bill until late in 1956, when his reelection was assured.  Loevy, supra, note 25, 
at 27.  More importantly, the Southern Democrats in Congress immediately organized to kill the 
bill’s most meaningful enforcement mechanisms.  Id. at 29.  Framing the issue as one of states’ 
rights, the Southern Democrats raised enough furor to scare Eisenhower into revoking his support 
for parts of the bill.  Id. at 29–30.  Satisfied that the bill was thus effectively toothless, the 
Southern Democrats allowed the bill to pass without filibuster.  Id. at 30.  A similarly weak Civil 
Rights Act of 1960 became law only after a filibuster by Southern Democrats in the Senate that 
rendered this bill equally toothless.  Id. at 36–37. 
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Philip Randolph, the founder of the Brotherhood of Pullman Porters, 
threatened to lead mass protests in Washington.26  In early 1963, neither John 
F. Kennedy nor Lyndon B. Johnson were ardent advocates for civil rights 
legislation.  President Kennedy was extremely reluctant to press for such 
legislation, fearing that his party would split over the issue and destroy his 
agenda.27 
The Act came about as a result of a grass roots mobilization that demanded 
momentous social change from political elites.  In particular, the extensive 
organization and training of citizens and students in nonviolent mass protest 
was critical in creating what ultimately seemed like spontaneous eruptions of 
civil disobedience across the South.28  The turning point in the movement came 
in the spring of 1963, with the Birmingham demonstrations led by Dr. Martin 
Luther King.29  King was aware that the police commissioner, Eugene “Bull” 
Connor, was a notorious racist who was prone to violence, and there is 
evidence that King intended to provoke him.30  King had always believed that 
the civil rights movement would be at its most influential when the American 
people saw his peaceful demonstrators contrasted against violent white 
attackers. To that end, his organization held conferences with the press to 
discuss the march and to ensure that the cameras would be rolling, and King 
brought schoolchildren to march in the demonstration with the adults.31  
Connor, as expected, responded violently, turning fire hoses and attack dogs on 
the demonstrators.32  The images of schoolchildren blasted with water and 
chased by dogs caused a tremendous uproar throughout the country and sent 
Birmingham into chaos.33  Numerous organizations, including labor unions, 
churches, and civic groups, joined hands with the civil rights movement in 
 
 26. See BAYARD RUSTIN, TIME ON TWO CROSSES: THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF BAYARD 
RUSTIN, at XV (Devon W. Carbado & Donald Weise eds., 2004) (citing such advances as 
occurring only after Randolph’s threat of mass protest). 
 27. Kennedy became president in an atmosphere highly charged with racial politics; the 
1960 campaign had seen both parties insert civil rights planks into their platforms.  Filvaroff & 
Wolfinger, supra note 13, at 10.  Kennedy himself had promised extensive legislative civil rights 
reforms and personally called Martin Luther King, Jr. while the civil rights leader was in jail.  Id. 
at 10–11.  Once he took office, however, he quickly backpedaled from his promises and reverted 
to the precedent of action only through executive orders.  Id. at 11.  Federal agencies were 
ordered to eliminate racial discrimination in their departments, the Justice Department increased 
its civil rights litigation, and federal aid for construction of segregated housing was eliminated.  
Id.  In 1962 he offered weak support for a bill that would eliminate literacy tests, but the bill 
quickly failed.  Id. 
 28. See infra note 36. 
 29. Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 13, at 11. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 11–12. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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demanding government action against discrimination.34  White racists began 
bombing King’s motel room, prompting angry black youths to counter with 
street violence against whites.35  Most importantly, the Birmingham 
demonstrations inspired almost a thousand similar nonviolent protests in over 
one hundred southern cities, which resulted in over twenty thousand arrests.36 
The Kennedy administration became terrified at the prospect of racial 
violence exploding across the country.37  For the first time, the policy makers 
in the White House came to believe that ignoring civil rights issues would be 
more politically disastrous than alienating the Southern Democrats in 
Congress.38  Inaction on the issue would not only lead to more demonstrations 
and violence, it would allow the Republicans to take the lead on civil rights 
and carry it straight through the presidential election next year.39  Kennedy 
thus appeared on national television in June, 1963, and told the public that he 
would send strong proposals to Congress to eliminate segregation in public 
accommodations.40  The Justice Department began drafting a bill, trying to 
strike a balance between a bill too strong to pass and a bill too weak to be 
worth passing.41 
The March on Washington, which occurred on August 28, 1963, added 
tremendous momentum to the legislative effort.  A. Philip Randolph first 
conceived of such a mass protest in 1941.  Randolph had been planning a mass 
 
 34. Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 13, at 11–12. 
 35. Id.  Two years later, “Bloody Sunday,” when civil rights protesters were met with violent 
beatings on the Edmund Pettus bridge in Selma, Alabama, while news cameras rolled, would 
provide a similar impetus for the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  See Symposium, 
Promoting Racial Equality, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 347, 379–80 (2001). 
 36. While this chorus of a thousand similar protests may have seemed spontaneous, they 
were the result of years of grassroots organizing.  See PAUL OSTERMAN, GATHERING POWER: 
THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA 18–19 (2002).  The successes of the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955 prompted the formation of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC) in 1957.  Formed with the express goal of stimulating mass direct action 
against racial oppression, SCLC united black Southern ministers who had all been involved in 
similar local protest movements in Southern communities.  Several training institutions, like the 
Highlander Folk School, were established specifically to cultivate local civil rights leadership 
across the South that would be skilled in the tactics of nonviolent social protest.  Id. at 53–54.  
The movement was founded on the persistent building of local institutions that could undertake 
similar training of citizens everywhere.  Id.  Not surprisingly, the major cultural events of the civil 
rights movement—the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Freedom Rides, Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee’s (SNCC) “Freedom Summer” in Mississippi, and the Birmingham 
protests—all flowed from this extensive, intentional grass roots organization.  See generally 
RUSTIN, supra note 26. 
 37. Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 13, at 13. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 13–14. 
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demonstration against black unemployment in conjunction with the 100-year 
anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.  This effort was quickly 
married to the effort to build support for the civil rights bill winding its way 
through Congress.  Randolph (representing the Negro American Labor 
Council), King (representing the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 
SCLC), and the leaders of the NAACP, Urban League, Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE), and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
formed a coalition to organize a national march in an effort to build on the 
spontaneous demonstrations occurring nationwide and to bring in as many 
allies as possible to the civil rights cause, especially trade unions and church 
groups.  Bayard Rustin, the early architect of nonviolent social protest that 
animated the movement and a strong adherent of coalition politics, was named 
the chief organizer of the march.  When more than 250,000 peaceful 
demonstrators descended on the national Mall—a quarter of whom were 
white—it constituted the largest mass demonstration in the nation’s history, 
one that received more national and international press coverage than any prior 
social protest.  President Kennedy, who had tried to get organizers to cancel 
the march, ultimately endorsed it publicly.42 
Republican support was absolutely necessary if a civil rights bill was going 
to be passed in the face of staunch opposition from Southern Democrats.43  The 
Kennedy administration engaged in intense negotiations with House 
Republicans, convincing them that it was in their political interest to support 
civil rights and allowing Republicans to take credit for several provisions of 
the bill.44  The end result was that the bill passed the House stronger than it had 
entered it.45  The bill entered the Senate several months after Kennedy’s 
assassination.  President Johnson announced shortly after taking office that his 
first priority was the enactment of the civil rights bill as passed in the House.46 
Johnson had already passed major points of his agenda by the time the bill 
reached the Senate, so he had little to fear from Southern Democrat reprisals.47  
In addition, as a Southern Democrat, he was determined not to appear weak on 
civil rights and jeopardize black support for the Democratic Party.48  In the 
Senate, Southern Democrats initiated a filibuster which continued until the 
Johnson administration marshaled enough votes for cloture by co-opting 
 
 42. This ever so brief summary of the coalition politics that animated passage of the Act 
does not begin to do justice to the civil rights movement and the courageous acts of thousands.  
For a prize-winning treatment of the subject, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: 
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63 (1988). 
 43. Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 13, at 14, 16. 
 44. Id. at 14–21. 
 45. Id. at 21–22. 
 46. Id. at 24. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 13, at 24. 
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Republicans who represented districts with small black populations and no 
racial conflict.49  The bill passed ultimately passed in the Senate by a lopsided 
vote of 73–27, with few alterations.50 
In the ensuing presidential election, Johnson won by a landslide with a 
coalition of Northern liberals and blacks, establishing the base of the 
Democratic party for the next forty years.  Presidential candidate Barry 
Goldwater, who had vociferously opposed both the cloture vote and the Act 
itself, carried only the Deep South and a few other states.  The efforts of 
moderate Republicans to give their party a pro-civil rights slant—which was 
the reason many of them supported the Act’s passage—were quickly washed 
away with Goldwater’s states’ rights rhetoric.51  Arch-conservatives, faced 
with resounding defeat in the presidential election, did more than lick their 
wounds.  They set about building the foundations for a conservative 
ideological movement in which ideas that were then out of the mainstream of 
even their own party would ultimately take center stage.  It took less than 
twenty years for a revitalized conservative movement to bear fruit in the 
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, and movement towards conservatism 
continues to be vital to this day.52  Meanwhile, the coalition of working-class 
and ethnic whites, liberals, and blacks that made the New Deal possible has 
eroded.53 
Nevertheless, the civil rights revolution and the legislation it gave birth to 
spawned other social movements.54  Many of the rights movements that 
followed the Act’s passage, especially the feminist movement, were rooted in 
frustration with the Act’s shortcomings.55  Emulating the work of women’s 
 
 49. Id. at 22–23. 
 50. Id. at 26. 
 51. See id. at 30. 
 52. By 2003, after the midterm elections, Democrats were both out of the White House and 
in the minority in both houses of Congress for the first time in fifty years—a minority position 
that appeared even more established after the 2004 presidential election in which George W. Bush 
garnered 51 percent of the vote.  Election Results, at http://cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/ 
results/president. 
 53. See Alexander Polikoff, Racial Inequality and the Black Ghetto, POVERTY & RACE, 
Nov./Dec. 2004, at 1 (detailing the demise of the New Deal coalition since November 1968). 
 54. Of course, the movement also led to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968. 
 55. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, charged with enforcing the Act’s 
prohibition against sex discrimination, largely ignored the 50,000 sex discrimination complaints 
that poured in within the first five years of its existence.  Bonnie Eisenberg & Mary Ruthsdotter, 
Living the Legacy: The Women’s Rights Movement 1848–1998, The National Women’s History 
Project, available at http://www.legacy98.org/move-hist.html (l998).  Angered by this sexism, 
but emboldened by the fact that civil rights legislation was passing through Congress at all, 
women began organizing to pass legislation targeted toward sex discrimination.  Id.  The National 
Organization for Women was founded in 1966 for just such a purpose, paving the way for a surge 
of women’s rights organizations dedicated toward legislative change.  Id.  The passage of Title IX 
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organizations, Latino, Asian, and gay and lesbian groups also sought to 
strengthen provisions of the Act or to introduce new legislation to address 
specific group concerns.  Indeed, the idea of interest-group organizing to 
achieve legislative goals, which is now a main conduit through which the 
citizenry interacts with government, is a legacy of the civil rights movement’s 
success with the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
C. Coalition Theory 
While blacks were the leaders and main participants in the civil rights 
movement, allies were welcomed.  In particular, the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), founded in April 1960 in alliance with 
SCLC, began the interracial brigades of non-violent civil rights workers that 
organized Freedom Summer and the Freedom rides.56  After a first wave of 
civil rights victories and an emerging “black power” movement, an explicit 
intellectual debate ensued about the efficacy of interracial coalitions.  The 
debate turned on whether blacks—a marginal, historically oppressed group—
and whites—a dominant, historic oppressor—could realistically work together 
in a way that would truly benefit black people.57 
Bayard Rustin, an African-American who had worked in pacifist and labor 
movements before turning to civil rights, often argued that political 
participation on the part of a range of interest and identity groups is necessary 
to any project of social reform.  “The issue is which coalition to join and how 
to make it responsive to your program,” he wrote.  “Necessarily there will be 
compromise.  But the difference between expediency and morality in politics is 
the difference between selling out a principle and making smaller concessions 
to win larger ones.”58  Rustin was quite explicit that his ambitions for the civil 
rights movement went beyond mere desegregation to the realm of economic 
justice.  Establishing “the Negro’s right to sit at a Woolworth’s counter” or to 
vote were relatively easy goals, he wrote.59  “[B]ut it demands much creativity, 
patience, and political stamina to plan, develop, and implement programs and 
priorities.  It is one thing to organize sentiment behind laws that do not disturb 
 
and the introduction of the Equal Rights Amendment, along with many other federal, state, and 
local sex discrimination laws, originated from the feminist movement’s emulation of the civil 
rights movement’s focus on legislation to overcome discrimination.  Id. 
 56. See generally RUSTIN, supra note 26. 
 57. The debate necessarily was mainly about “blacks” and “whites” because at the time the 
nation was 87 percent white, 10 percent black, and only 3 percent “other.”  See infra note 68. 
 58. Michael Anderson, The Organizer, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 9, 2003, at 13 (quoting 
RUSTIN, supra note 26). 
 59. Bayard Rustin, “Black Power” and Coalition Politics, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1966, at 35, 
40. 
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consensus politics, and quite another to win battles for the redistribution of 
wealth.”60 
Rustin argued that true racial equality would require a redistribution of 
resources in the form of an aggressive program of federal spending.  He 
supported A. Philip Randolph’s proposed $100 billion Freedom Budget, an 
effort on the order of the Marshall plan, because, he argued, only $20 billion or 
more in annual spending would “destroy the economic and social 
consequences of racism and poverty at home today.”61  Such an audacious 
agenda necessitated coalition politics that expanded beyond the mere 10 
percent of the population that blacks then constituted.  Then, as now, 
meaningful reform required altering current political consensus and therefore, 
he argued, “[w]e must see to it that the liberal-labor-civil rights coalition is 
maintained and, indeed, strengthened.”62  For this reason, Rustin publicly 
rejected the emerging rhetoric of “black power,” and its underlying skepticism 
about the viability of coalition politics.  He also seemed to recognize the 
centrality of self-interest in American politics.  He advocated a broader agenda 
that spoke to the needs of all poor and working class people.  A “liberal-labor-
civil rights coalition,” he argued, “would work to make the Democratic party 
truly responsive to the aspirations of the poor and would develop support for 
programs . . . aimed at the reconstruction of American society in the interests 
of greater social justice.”63  In his view, the advocates of “black power” were 
merely aiming to create “a new black establishment.”64 
Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton answered Rustin in their book, 
Black Power.  In a chapter entitled “The Myths of Coalition” they attacked the 
notion that political coalitions and the civil rights gains they wrought were 
animated by anything other than raw self-interest.  Perceiving the interests of 
whites and blacks to often be adverse, they argued that the so-called “allies” of 
black people would prove unreliable when a conflict of interest arises.65  With 
this clear-eyed understanding, they articulated their view as to when coalitions 
between blacks and whites could be viable, even as they approached the 
subject with much skepticism: 
We . . . recognize the potential for limited, short-term coalitions on relatively 
minor issues.  But we must note that such approaches seldom come to terms 
 
 60. Id. (emphasis added). 
 61. Id.; see also id. at 36 (advocating the Freedom Budget). 
 62. Id. at 40; see also id. at 36 (noting that “one-tenth of the population cannot accomplish 
much by itself”). 
 63. Id. at 36. 
 64. Rustin, supra note 59, at 36. 
 65. STOKELY CHARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF 
LIBERATION IN AMERICA 75–76 (1967).  Stokely Carmichael changed his name to Kwame Ture 
after publication of BLACK POWER.  In this essay, when I refer to him as the author of that text, I 
use the name Stokely Carmichael. 
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with the roots of institutional racism.  In fact, one might well argue that such 
coalitions on subordinate issues are, in the long run, harmful.  They could lead 
whites and blacks into thinking either that their long-term interests do not 
conflict when in fact they do, or that such lesser issues are the only issues 
which can be solved.  With these limitations in mind, and a spirit of caution, 
black people can approach possibilities of coalition for specific goals. 
  Viable coalitions therefore stem from four preconditions: (a) the 
recognition by the parties involved of their respective self-interests; (b) the 
mutual belief that each party stands to benefit in terms of that self-interest from 
allying with the other or others; (c) the acceptance of the fact that each party 
has its own independent base of power and does not depend for ultimate 
decision-making on a force outside itself; and (d) the realization that the 
coalition deals with specific and identifiable—as opposed to general and 
vague—goals.66 
Like Rustin, my concern is with altering current political consensus in a 
legislative or policymaking context.  Specifically, I want progressives to 
recapture majoritarian politics in order to pursue different, more progressive 
public policy choices—ones that give broader opportunity to everyone and that 
reduce racial inequality.  In the brutal world of politics and policymaking, that 
will require commanding 51 percent on any given policymaking or elective 
vote.  But to advance and sustain an entire progressive agenda, progressives 
will need to cultivate enduring coalitions that regularly command more than 51 
percent.  Again, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed by about a 75 percent 
margin, at least in the Senate, attesting to the centrality of progressive politics 
at that time. 
Frederick Douglass famously said, “Power concedes nothing without a 
demand, it never did and it never will.”  Indeed, Douglass emphasized the 
necessity of struggle in any quest for reform, especially one involving the 
freedom and uplift of historically oppressed African-Americans.67  The civil 
 
 66. Id. at 79.  This early articulation of the preconditions for interracial coalition building has 
been influential and tested in recent political science literature concerning the efficacy of such 
coalitions.  See, e.g., Paula D. McClain & Steven C. Tauber, Racial Minority Group Relations in 
a Multiracial Society, in GOVERNING AMERICAN CITIES: INTERETHNIC COALITIONS, 
COMPETITION, AND CONFLICT 111, 113 (Michael Jones-Correa ed., 2001); Raphael J. 
Sonenshein, Biracial Coalitions in Big Cities: Why They Succeed, Why They Fail, in RACIAL 
POLITICS IN AMERICAN CITIES 193, 199 (Rufus P. Browning et al. eds., 1990). 
 67. To put the quote in full context, Douglass stated: 
Let me give you a word of the philosophy of reform.  The whole history of the progress of 
human liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her august claims, have been born of 
earnest struggle.  The conflict has been exciting, agitating, all-absorbing, and for the time 
being, putting all other tumults to silence.  It must do this or it does nothing.  If there is no 
struggle there is no progress.  Those who profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate 
agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without 
thunder and lightening.  They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. 
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rights movement is a vindication of Douglass’s argument.  As noted above, an 
intense, grass-roots struggle that demanded social change from those in 
political power was the only successful route to passage of meaningful civil 
rights legislation.  In sum, progressives should expect struggle; toil and 
sacrifice will be required to command power.  And, progressives should build 
alliances among groups with ostensibly common interests. 
In 1964 about 87 percent of the population was white, 10 percent was 
black, and the small remainder was composed of other races.  Today, Latinos 
outnumber African-Americans, and demographers predict that we will become 
a majority-minority nation shortly after mid-century.68  Latinos are our fastest 
growing demographic group, followed by Asians.69  One might think that more 
diversity and a declining percentage of whites would lead to a more 
progressive politics, but the rise of conservatism since 1964 belies this 
intuition.  Among the challenges to progressive coalition building are the 
friction and transaction costs created by new racial complexity and the risk of 
zero-sum politics prevailing over coalition politics. 
Despite the challenges, I believe progressives have no alternative but to 
pursue coalitions with potential allies.  In the most diverse of places, frequently 
large urban centers, the reality of growing racial diversity is that it is 
increasingly unlikely that a single racial group can succeed independently.  In 
such diverse environments, coalition building is the imperative route to 
political power.  Diversity can be a source of power if properly harnessed.  The 
risk with ever complex diversity, however, is that the administrative costs of 
intergroup negotiations and the potential for conflict increases with each new 
group or interest that must be incorporated.  This is compounded with the risk 
of zero-sum perceptions, in the construction trades for example, and the sheer 
difficulty of establishing intergroup communication and understanding.70 
 
This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both moral 
and physical, but it must be a struggle.  Power concedes nothing without a demand.  It 
never did and it never will.  Find out just what any people will quietly submit to and you 
have found out the exact measure of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon 
them, and these will continue till they are resisted with either words or blows, or with 
both. . . . Men may not get all they pay for in this world, but they must certainly pay for 
all they get.  If we ever get free from the oppressions and wrongs heaped upon us, we 
must pay for their removal.  We must do this by labor, by suffering, by sacrifice, and if 
needs be, by our lives and the lives of others. 
Frederick Douglass, The Significance of Emancipation in the West Indies, Address Delivered in 
Canandaigua, New York (Aug. 3, 1857), in 3 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS: 1855-63, 183, 
204 (John W. Blassingame ed. 1979). 
 68. See CASHIN,  supra note 4, at 90. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 70–78 (underscoring the communication and other challenges to 
cultivating successful integrated communities and institutions). 
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There are inspiring examples of multiracial, multi-class coalitions that 
have transcended race, class, and ideology to move a policymaking body to a 
more progressive course.  Dallas Area Interfaith (DAI), an affiliate of the 
Industrial Areas Foundation (AIF), was started by a group of black, white, and 
Latino ministers and local leaders.  DAI transcends stereotyping by organizing 
around people’s interests rather than their fears.71  It remains cohesive in part 
by refusing to meet unless membership of all three ethnic groups—blacks, 
whites, and Latinos—are present.  By frontally challenging the way certain 
public officials had been exploiting racial divisions, DAI was responsible for 
getting the City of Dallas as well as Dallas Independent School District (DISD) 
to create and then later to increase funding for after-school programs 
throughout the school district.  Even more impressive, DAI was largely 
responsible for passage of a $1.4 billion school bond initiative.  They 
succeeded first by breaking up a coalition of white and Latino members of the 
Dallas school board known as the “slam-dunk group.”72  Consistent with 
political science research concerning other school boards throughout the 
nation, the white and Latino members of the board had operated as a voting 
block that frequently opposed the black members of the board.73  DAI was able 
to turn out large numbers of community leaders at school board meetings; it 
persuaded the Latino members of the school board to ally with black board 
members to support the after-school program, which white members had 
opposed.  The school board ultimately appropriated more money than DAI had 
originally requested for the program and brought about the demise of the slam-
dunk coalition.74 
The success of the DAI is not accidental.  Built on the pioneering work of 
Saul Alinsky, all IAF affiliates follow the same principles: community 
organization that focuses around a coalition of institutions, usually churches, 
but also unions, education associations, and other groups.75  Most importantly, 
IAF leaders frankly accept self-interest as the driving motivation for all parties 
involved in politics.  Alinsky insisted that the only basis on which long-term 
stable organizations could be built was to found them on self-interest of their 
participants.  Hence, IAF teaches its members how to identify self-interest and 
use it strategically.76  As the example of Dallas Area Interfaith attests, this 
strategy has proved successful, sometimes enormously so, in enabling IAF 
 
 71. See OSTERMAN, supra note 36, at 77. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 77–78; see also Kenneth J. Meier & Joseph Stewart, Jr., Cooperation and Conflict 
in Multiracial School Districts, 53 J. OF POL. 1123, 1123 (1991) (examining politics in 118 
multiracial urban school districts and finding that “Anglos-Latino” coalitions are more likely to 
be formed than “Black-Latino” coalitions). 
 74. See OSTERMAN, supra note 36, at 78. 
 75. Id. at 40. 
 76. Id. at 49. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND COALITION POLITICS 1045 
affiliates to alter the political status quo and move policymakers to a 
progressive course.77 Elsewhere I have offered other examples of multiracial 
coalitions among seemingly strange bedfellows that were formed based upon 
mutual, enlightened self-interest—an understanding that can be created 
through the artful dissemination of empirical data.78 
As we celebrate and reflect on the successes (and unmet promise) of the 
civil rights movement we cannot ignore those factors that made the movement 
possible.  A transcendant social order cannot and will not be achieved without 
the hard work of grass-roots mobilization.  Progressive, majority power will 
not be achieved without expanding our numbers.  While the path of least 
resistance is to work solely within a single issue, or single identity 
organizations and communities, progressives will be increasingly 
disempowered if they fail to organize the constituencies they care about. 
At the same time, progressives need to develop an empathy with the 
seeming stranger who might become a bedfellow.  They should not write off 
the white working-class guy, the so-called “Nascar dad,” who may seem at 
first blush to be too far across a cultural divide to cultivate.  Nor should they 
write off any racial, ethnic, or class constituency whose interests would seem 
to converge with a progressive agenda.  Instead, progressives should develop 
the language and data to engage every potential ally.  In my view, this is the 
only way progressivism will return to the mainstream of American politics. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
When Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote his famous “Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail” on April 16, 1963, he was responding not just to eight 
Alabama clergymen who had published a statement in the local newspaper 
criticizing the timing and wisdom of the Birmingham demonstration, but also 
to the many detractors of direct mass protest, including traditional civil rights 
organizations.  King, like Frederick Douglass before him, knew “through 
painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it 
 
 77. An exemplar is the Greater Boston Interfaith Organization (GBIO) which led a state-
wide campaign that won passage in the state legislature of a $100 million Housing Trust Fund in 
2000.  GBIO “worked successfully for a $30 million annual increase in state capital budget for 
housing . . . won a $2 million increase in funding for Boston Public Schools for textbooks and 
instructional supplies . . . secured a $23 million commitment in new funding for affordable 
housing from City of Boston. . . . raised a $6 million loan fund at 0% interest to finance the 
construction of Nehemiah homes affordable to average working families [and] . . . organized with 
the Justice for Janitor’s [sic] campaign to win significant pay and benefit increases for area 
janitors.”  Greater Boston Interfaith Organization, Key Achievements, at http://www.gbio.org 
(last visited May 16, 2005). 
 78. See CASHIN, supra note 4, at 304–17 (summarizing the work of regionalist, community 
development, and smart growth organizations). 
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must be demanded by the oppressed.”79  At the same time, King was 
“cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states” and the 
“inescapable network of mutuality” we live in.80  He dared believe that “our 
fear-drenched communities” could one day radiate with “love and 
brotherhood.”81  If King had accepted the pessimism of so many progressives 
today, he never would have written that letter and persevered in his belief that 
a different social order could be brought about.82  Dramatic change is 
inevitable as a result of growing diversity.  The only question is, will 
progressives harness it and do the hard work of building alliances across 
boundaries of difference, or will we continue to despair at the status quo, while 
others organize and continue to divide us from people and interests groups who 
could be our natural allies? 
 
 
 79. Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King, Jr. (Apr. 16, 1963), in BLESSED ARE 
THE PEACEMAKERS 242 (S. Jonathan Bass ed., 2001). 
 80. Id. at 239. 
 81. Id. at 256. 
 82. Professor John Powell, of Ohio State University, made this statement at a panel on 
residential integration on which we both appeared during a conference on building integrated 
communities.  The panel was sponsored by the Open Society on Oct. 22, 2004, in Cherry Hill, 
New Jersey. 
